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Does Slower Monetary Expansion
Discriminate Against Housing?
rrHE “Declaration of National Housing Policy”
in
the Housing Act of 1949 establishes as one of the
national objectives “the realization as soon as feasible
of the goal of a decent home and suitable living
environment for every American family”; and it
requires programs “to encourage and assist ... the
stabilization of the housing industry at a high volume
of residential construction”. In view of the importance
of housing, there is a natural hesitancy on the part
of any policy maker to take actions which he con-
siders to be detrimental to the housing industry.
In our complex society it is difficult to determine
which policies are detrimental to the housing situa-
tion, and there are few standards for judging to
what extent other desirable objectives should be
subordinated to achieve this one,tm This study is an
investigation of the extent to which the residential
construction industry is affected by a shift from rapid
monetary expansion to a more moderate rate of
monetary growth. The study presents and examines
the evidence frequently cited as bearing on the ques-
tion of whether the housing sector should act as a
constraint in the fonnulation of monetary policy
designed for the general welfare.
Recent Economic Developments
Total demand for goods and services (gross na-
tional product) has been excessive since last sum-
~The Employment Act of 1946 requires the Government to
initiate policies “to promote maximum employment, produc-
tion, and purchasing power”.
mer, adding to inflationary pressures. Since the third
quarter of 1967, total demand has gone up at over
a 9 per cent annual rate. By comparison, the upward
trend growth in spending since 1957 has been about
6 per cent per year, and the increase in productive
capacity has been at an estimated 4 per cent rate,
Reflecting the strong demands, overall prices have
risen at a 4 per cent rate since last summer, about
double the trend rate since 1957.
Despite the rapid growth in total demand, the
increasing upward pressures on prices, and a resulting
deterioration in the nation’s balance of payments
with the rest of the world, monetary growth con-
tinued at a rapid rate. In the ten months ended
November 1967, the money supply rose at a 7.7
per cent annual rate, the fastest rate of increase over
any ten-month period since 1948. Since November
money has risen at about a 5.7 per cent rate, faster
than 90 per cent of the six-month periods. By com-
parison, the trend growth in money supply was 2.4
per cent per year from 1957 to 1966.
One reason that sharp monetary expansion was not
abated last fall and winter was a fear that monetary
restraint would bear heavily and inequitably on the
housing sector. As early as the July 18, 1967, meeting
of the Federal Open Market Committee, a reason
cited in the published record of the policy actions
for not moving toward monetary restraint was “that
any significant further increases in market interest
rates might reduce the’flows of funds into mortgages
and slow the recovery under way in residential con-
Page 5struction activity”. According to the published record,
similar sentiments have been expressed or implied at
other meetings,
The economic problem facing the nation since last
summer has been one of excessive total demands for
goods and services. According to traditional views,
monetary actions should be designed with the ob-
jective of reducing these demands to the extent
necessary to attain price stability while continuing
to achieve relatively full utilization of resources, In
reducing total demands, the demand for housing also
will be affected. The issue is whether the burden of
the cutbacks falls particularly heavily or inequitably
on this industry.
Monetary Periods
Some insight into the effect of monetary actions
on residential construction can be obtained from a
review of periods in our recent history when mone-
tary actions were relatively less expansive. Rates of
growth in the money supply (demand deposits plus
currency) are used in this phase of the study as a
measure of monetary expansion.2
Chart I plots the money stock since 1951. The
shaded areas are periods of relatively slow (or nega-
tive) money growth, The fastest rate of growth of
tm
Constructing periods on the basis of unadjusted market
interest rates would give much different results. It is not
clear, however, that a more sophisticated interest rate study
which includes an analysis of changing inflationary expec-
tations, methods of Government finance, and other forces
influencing the demand for credit would give a significantly
different picture.
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the money supply during these slow growth periods
was an 0.8 per cent annual rate, whereas the average
growth over the entire 1951-1967 period was at a
2.3 per cent rate. Throughout the rest of this article
these periods are considered to be ones of monetary
restraint and are denoted on the charts by shading,
Slow Monetary Crowth and
Residential Construction
Comparison of expenditures on housing relative to
total spending indicates that relatively slow rates of
monetary growth do not cause excessive cutbacks in
spending for homes. Chart II shows outlays on resi-
dential construction as a per cent of gross national
product in real terms since 1951. In this period the
housing sector has begun a prolonged decline rela-
tive to other sectors on three occasions. An interest-
ing aspect of the chart is that each of these three
instances was during a period of monetary expansion.
During the first three to six months of a period of
slow monetary expansion, the housing sector has
tended to continue its relative decline begun during
a previous period of monetary expansion;3 but then
as monetary restraint continued, housing tended to
level off or start rising relative to other activities.
The one exception was the 1959-1960 period.
tm
The decline was particularly sharp in the early months of
the 1966 monetary restraint period, when Government
regulations caused a marked reduction in the flow of funds
into mortgages. A discussion of these market interferences is
presented later.
Page 6The number of new, private, nonfarm houses
started each quarter (Chart III) has followed a
similar pattern. All marked and sustained declines
in housing starts began in periods of monetary ex-
pansion. In several cases the decline in starts was
reversed after three to six months of monetary re-
straint, and the number of housing starts actually
increased.
One reason a traditional view has developed that a
relatively slow growth of money damages the housing
industry is a belief that high interest rates indicate
monetary restraint. However, the facts do not bear
out this association, as an article in the November
1967 issue of this Review pointed out.
An examination of recent history indicates that
rapid expansion in bank credit and money has re-
sulted, after a brief lag, in excessive demands for
goods and services, higher prices, and hence, rising
interest rates. A slowdown in monetary growth irn-
posed during an inflationary period has temporarily
reinforced upward pressures on interest rates as the
supply of -credit was reduced. After about four
months, however, when monetary actions have be-
come effective in reducing aggregate spending and
inflationary expectations, the demand for credit also
has fallen. Entrepreneurs’ demands for investment
were lessened not only because of the lower over-
all demand, but due to reduced pressures to buy
goods today to get a cheaper price. Contraction in
the demand for credit has caused interest rates to
fall. Mortgage interest rates have behaved in roughly
New Housing Starts
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Stale and local 86 - .06
Public Utility 1.03 - .25
Commercial 1.21 - .27
Industrial 1.34 - .24
Residential 1.72 - .29
Plant Equipment
Producer Durables 1.20 - .17
Farm Equipment 1.14 - .19
Automobiles 1.66 - .26
These results demonstrate that a rise in interest
rates has affected home building more than most
other activities. The responsiveness of housing to in-
= National avcrage of the average monthly contract
interest rates on conventional mortgages on new
homes made by savings and loans.
mt = Monthly average of seasonally adjusted private demand
deposits plus currency in the hands of the public.
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All variables were significant at the 1 per cent level.
5
Andersen, Leonall, The Review of Economics and Statistics,
August 3, 1964, Harvard University, Boston, pp. 260-268,
the same manner as other interest rates4.
In a study by Leonall Andersen on “The Incidence
of Monetary and Fiscal Measures on the Structure of
Output”,3 the following interest rate elasticities for
the residential housing industry and other major
sectors of investment were found:
Elasticities of Equilibrium Output With Respect
To Income and interest Rates Elastics
INCOME INTEREST
t
The following regression indicates that during the 1960-1967
period conventional mortgage rates have been negatively
related to a three-month period of monetary restraint, but
positively related during ten-month periods.
Monetary restraint was considered to be an annual growth
rate of less than 2.6 per cent (the trend over the 1957-1967
period). At this rate money would grow 0.6 per cent over
three months, and 2,4 per cent over ten months. Assuming
that this rate of growth is neutral, a negative regression
coefficient implies a reverse relationship between money
growth and mortgage interest rates, and a positive coefficient
suggests that rates move in the same direction as money’s
movement around the neutral rate of growth. These assump-
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Page 7terest rates results in large part because financing
normally represents a large proportion of total costs.
Now, Charts II and III are more understandable.
Rising interest rates, which usually accompany pro-
longed periods of monetary expansion, act as a deter-
rent to housing. The damaging effect might be con-
tinued temporarily by initial upward pressures on
interest rates resulting from a more restrictive mone-
tary action, but the falling rates resulting from the
over-all effect of a more moderate growth in money
are a powerful stimulus to the housing sector.
Interest rates are not the only factor affecting
housing demand, and its responsiveness to interest
rates probably changes as people’s expectations of a
“normal” or future interest rate change. If, for exam-
ple, rates remained at a high level for an extended
period, increasing demand might result as the “nor-
mal” rate gradually shifted upward. This partially
explains how a spurt in housing could develop in
early 1967 when mortgage rates were at a high level.
Although long-term rates were relatively high, they
were slightly lower than those in the immediately
preceding period, which probably weighs heaviest on
people’s expectations.
Although changes in market interest rates do bear
heavily on residential construction, much of the im-
Comparison of Construction Costs
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pact flows from the unavailability of funds caused by
interferences to the market process rather than the
higher rates, per se. Many obstructions to real estate
financing result from Governmental laws, regulations,
and practices, while others reflect institutional rigidi-
ties.
One example of market interference is the usury
laws which in some areas may prohibit interest rates
on mortgages from rising to the going market rate,
Another such interference is Regulation Q and other
rate regulations on financial intermediaries, making
these institutions, which lend heavily on real estate,
less competitive than big businesses and Government
in obtaining funds during periods of relatively high
market rates. Another practice discriminating against
real estate financing is administrative pressure on
Federal Home Loan Banks at times of money market
tightness to restrain their borrowing and relending to
savings and loan associations. Another is the rigidity
of contract rates on FHA and VA loans, with the
accompanying discriminating “point” discounting
system of mortgage financing.
Alternatives to Slower Monetary Expansio-n
Inflation, an alternative to proper monetary re-
straint, not only hurts the housing industry by in-
creasing the cost of financing, but it raises the costs
of building a house.°According to data published by
the U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment for twenty major pricing areas of the country,
the labor and materials cost of constructing a selected
sample of brick and frame houses rose at a 4.2 per
cent annual rate from 1963 to 1967 (Chart IV). Some
of the rise in costs may have reflected a bidding away
of men and materials for tile war effoft, but about
two-thirds of this increase can be attributed to a
general inflationary price rise. The increase in the
price of homes between 1963 and 1967 resulted in 13.5
per cent higher monthly payments on housing. During
the same period average interest rates on new mort-
gages rose about 1¼ percentage points, resulting in
about 12.5 per cent higher monthly payments on a
25-year loan. However, this increase in interest rates
tookplace mainly in periods of rapid money expansion
and may come back down after excessive demands
and inflationary pressures are eliminated. The higher
cost of housing as a result of inflation is not ]Jlcely
to be reduced by much.
6
The higher construction costs may he offset only partly
by a rise in the expected future resale value of the house.
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Slower Monetary Growth and Other
Sectors of the Economy
Consumer and Business
Although monetary restraint may affect the total
real dollars spent on housing, the housing sector is
not the only one to feel a monetary squeeze. Chart
V shows two other sectors plotted along with resi-
dential construction: (1) outlays on consumer dur-
able goods, such as automobiles, appliances, and fur-
niture, and (2) expenditures on business machines
and other producers’ durable equipment plus changes
in business inventories. Each sector is plotted as a
percentage of real GNP to relate the effect on it to
the effect on over-all activity.
Both consumer durable goods and producers’ dur-
able equipment have had a slight upward trend rela-
tive to total production since 1951, while residential
construction has trended downward; yet the formers’
declines or slower rates of increases during periods
of slow money growth have been roughly equal to
those in the latter. Also, declines in the other two
sectors sometimes actually began during the periods
of slow monetary expansion. It appears that housing
has not been any more adversely affected during
periods of relatively slow monetary growth than have
these other sectors.
ConstructionEmployment
Monetary restraint does not appear to bear unduly
on construction workers, Although an initial move
toward slower monetary growth has temporarily re-
inforced a decline in the housing sector, the evidence
suggests that most workers in residential construc-
tion have not been at an increased disadvantage in
finding jobs. Unemployment among construction
workers typically is higher than unemployment gen-
erally, as can he no-ted in Chart VI. From the chart it
is evident that periods of slower monetary growth
usually did not affect construction workers much more
than they did workers in other activities. Unemploy-
ment in this industry rose at times in the first few
months of the restrictive period, hut, in general, the
relative unemployment of construction workers
changed little during periods of monetary restraint.
Construction workers, being relatively mobile and
skilled, may have been better able to find jobs than
~vere others with less skill and mobility.
Contractors
The experience of contractors has been similar.
Chart VII plots failures of construction firms as a
Unemployment in construction
Compored with Total Unemployment”























Page 9savings and loan associations. Chart VIII shows yearly
Business Failures in Construction profits of all savings and loan intitutions since 1951
osaPerCentoflotalBusinessFoilures and yearly rates of change of profits. A striking
Cent i. ~ .rs~. Per Cent feature of the chart is that since 1951 savings and
loan companies in the aggregate have had increased
absolute profits each year. Also, during periods
of monetary restraint profits grew at an expanding
rate, except in the 1966 period when a trend toward
a slower rate of increase already had begun.
From 1952 to 1966 profits of savings and loan com-
panies rose at a 16 per cent average annual rate, and
in 1966 they went up 7.3 per cent. Mutual savings
banks had similar results, Their net income grew at an
11 per cent average rate between 1953 and 1966,
and 10 per cent during 1966.
Profits of a mutual association may not be compar-
able with earnings of other firms which deduct the
cost of obtaining funds as an expense. But, even if
the cost of attracting share accounts (i.e., dividends)
is deducted from profits, the remaining additions to
reserves have been sizeable each year since 1952.
Even in the adverse year of 1966, savings and loan
associations were able to add $600 million to their
per cent of total business failures. Although there has
been an upward trend in failures of construction
firms relative to other businesses, their relative posi-
tion improved temporarily in four out of the five
cases of monetary restraint since 1951. The one ex-
ception was the 1959-1960 period.
The upward trend in construction failures may have
reflected the uptrend in interest rates resulting from
excessive total demands and inflation, Then, too, it
may have been partially a reaction to some over-
building in the fifties. The relatively small size of most
contractors, perpetuated in part by zoning laws and
building ordinances, may have made the industry less
viable, A bigger enterprise with more capital and
reserves more easily could accept temporary losses
and changes in the economy. A part of the hardships
suffered by contractors, as well as a factor tending
to discourage large amounts of capital from coming
into the industry, may be associated with those reg-
ulations which the same concerns use to gain tem-
porary advantages.
Financial Intermediaries
Restrictive monetary actions may have an effect
on housing by affecting adversely the flow of funds
into financial intermediaries which extend most of
the housing credit. Yet, a review of some measures
of industry performance does not indicate that finan-
cial intermediaries are any more severely affected
by a relatively slow rate of monetary expansion than
is business in general. A chief intermediary is the
Page 10reserves, and the ratio of reserves to total savings
balances rose from 7,90 per cent to 8.18 per cent.
Savings and loan associations have been hindered
temporarily during periods of slow monetary growth
in securing savings. There have been several set-
backs in the rate of increase in savings capital of
these institutions during periods of monetary restraint,
and for one quarter (third quarter 1966) there was
a moderate net decline (Chart IX). Rising interest
rates make yields on savings accounts, which are
regulated by FHLB “rate controls”, relatively less
attractive than rates paid in the free market. To a
great extent the real problem has been not in the
rising market interest rates, but in rate controls on
the savings and loan associations, Nevertheless, de-
spite all the market imperfections, increases in net
savings funds in savings and loan associations have
been at an average 13.6 per cent annual rate since
1952; in the most adverse year — 1966— they rose
4 per cent. Similarly, deposits in mutual savings banks
increased at a 7 per cent average annual rate in the
1952-1966 period and 5 per cent during 1966.
Financial intermediaries perform an economic func-
tion by borrowing short-term funds and lending them
for long terms- Therefore, a sharp unexpected rise in
the market interest rate structure puts them at a
temporary disadvantage. To compete for funds to
make new loans and provide for withdrawals, they
must raise interest rate payments on all their out-
standing deposits,7 but yields on their assets are
fixed, As a result, expenses rise much more rapidly
than earnings in the short run. Because of this situa-
tion, some feel that a rapid rise in market interest
rates accompanied by higher rates paid by inter-
mediaries may cause a general collapse of these
financial institutions. It is partially for this reason that
interest rates paid by financial intermediaries are
regulated.
Although an industry that borrows short and lends
long may incur losses for a period when interest
rates rise sharply, most financial intermediaries have
considerable ability to withstand these temporary
periods when their terms of trade are adverse. In
addition to their own resources, savings and loan as-
sociations and mutual savings banks may borrow from
Federal Home Loan Banks,
For example, the hook value of aggregate reserves
and undivided profits of savings and loan institutions
is nearly twice the size of their yearly dividend pay-
7
There are exceptions, of course, such as paying higher
rates on certificates or for funds left for a longer period.
Savings capital
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ments. They also have cash and Government security
holdings from which payments could be made totaling
over double their yearly dividend payments. These
ratios prevailed even at the end of 1966, after the
associations had endured their most adverse year.
This means that the average association could remain
solvent in an accounting sense and pay its dividends
for nearly two years, even though it had no net
profits. Yet, in every year since World War II, these
associations have had greater profits than in the
previous year.
Also, throughout the period of rising interest rates,
greater returns will he flowing in from the loans
made at the higher rates; in 1967, for example, re-
payments of regular instalments, interest, and ad-
vance repayments because of house sales amounted
to about 15 per cent of average total outstanding
mortgages at savings and loan associations. Even
more important, periods of monetary restraint rarely
have lasted even a year in length, and after a few
months of slower monetary growth interest rates
have had a tendency to come down.
Page 11COnCIUS-jOsis
This analysis is tentative; a complete study would
require an examination of the data presented in much
more detail, as well as additional evidence bearing
on the subject of discriminatory effects of monetary
policy. Nevertheless, it appears from the information
thus far developed that the requirements of the hous-
ing industry should not act as a constraint on mone-
tary policy designed for the general welfare.
In this analysis, periods of extreme monetary re-
straint svere studied. With the advantage of hind-
sight, it now appears that in most of these periods
monetary actions were unduly restrictive, since all
economic recessions since 1952 commenced during
these periods. Housing was affected during periods
of slow monetary growth, particularly in the first few
months, but indications are that the housing industry
was affected little more than was activity in general
throughout all the periods of restraint. The wide-
spread belief that housing has been seriously hurt by
monetary restraint probably has resulted from mis-
takenly identifying rising market interest rates with
monetary restraint. Interest rates, unadjusted for price
developments and for Government borrowing, and
This article is available as reprint series No. 29.
unrelated to changing profit expectations of businesses,
are usually a poor guide to either the rate of monetary
expansion or its impact on economic activity.
Conversely, the evidence is strong that housing is
seriously affected by excessive total demand for
goods and services and inflation, Not only do the ex-
cesses drive up the costs of constructing houses, but
these huge demands and the inflationary pressures
push up market interest rates, which tend to bear
heavily on the housing industry.
Little evidence has been found to indicate that the
housing industry or the financial intermediaries are
affected in such a manner which makes them gain
from excessive monetary expansion. It seems that
they, as most other sectors, flourish best in an economy
growing at a relatively steady rate without inflation.
The housing industry might be benefited, however,
by a repeal or a liberalization of laws, regulations,
and practices that interfere with the free flow of
funds from the saver to the ultimate borrower.
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